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Abstract
In a model of repeated Cournot competition under complete information, we show that delegation
has no effect on cartel stability if managers collude, while it may hinder cartel stability when owners
collude in setting the incentive schemes If owners can choose whether to delegate or keep control
of their respective firms, and both groups of individuals collude or play non-cooperatively in their
respective variables according to the level of intertemporal discount factor, then if managers are
not able to collude in output levels, owners’ delegation decision is non-monotone in the discount
factor
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1. Introduction
The issue of cartel stability has received a great deal of attention in the recent literature.
Several aspects of the competitive conditions characterising market interaction may affect
firms’ ability to reach a collusive agreement and maintain it over time. d’Aspremont et al.
(1983), Donsimoni (1985) and Donsimoni et al. (1986) have dealt with the consequences
of heterogeneity among agents on cartel stability. In another vein, Green and Porter (1984),
Rees (1985) and Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) have focused upon the role of imperfect
information. The common feature characterising these streams of research is that they all
deal with elements which are exogenously given and, as such, cannot be affected by firms’
behaviour. How about factors that, on the contrary, can be manipulated to some extent before
market competition or collusion takes place? A lot of effort has been produced in analysing
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the interaction between the stability of collusion and the degree of product differentiation
(see, inter alia, Deneckere (1983), Chang (1991), Ross (1992), Häckner (1994), Häckner
(1995), Lambertini (1997), Lambertini et al. (1998) and Albæk and Lambertini (1998)).
This literature offers ambiguous results.
Here, we want to address whether the sustainability of collusion can be affected by del-
egating control to managers who do not necessarily aim at strict profit maximisation. The
delegation issue was introduced in the literature by Fershtman (1985) and Vickers (1985),
who showed that delegation is a dominant strategy in a one-shot non-cooperative game,
in that delegation makes the firm more aggressive under Cournot competition and creates
a credible commitment towards output expansion. This idea has been developed in sev-
eral directions since (see Fershtman and Judd (1987), Sklivas (1987), Basu (1995) and
Lambertini (2000)). A few contributions in this field focus on the possibility for delegation
to enhance firms’ ability to reach a cooperative outcome in one-shot games (Fershtman
et al., 1991; Polo and Tedeschi, 1992). From these papers it emerges that, even in strictly
non-cooperative games, cooperative outcomes arise as equilibria of the delegation game,
provided every principal is committed to the contract signed with the agent and contracts
are publicly observable. The fact that contracts are common knowledge opens the pos-
sibility that they may be conditioned upon in the agents’ subgame. 1 The cooperative
outcomes obtained in these papers are in strong contrast with those reached by Vickers
(1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987), where the agents’ behaviour is
not conditional on the compensation scheme agreed upon with their respective principals.
Barcena-Ruiz and Paz Espinoza (1996) address the issue of the optimal duration of del-
egation contracts under either price or quantity competition. They find that the slope of
owners’ reaction function at the incentive stage always replicates the slope of reaction func-
tions at the market stage. As a result, the best reply to a long-term contract is a long-term
contract, if downstream competition takes place in quantities, while it is a short-term con-
tract if the market stage is played in the price space. An alternative justification for the
use of delegation is given by Zábojník (1998). Shareholders may find it optimal to pro-
vide managers with incentives to maximise sales in addition to profits in the presence of
a double agency problem. In this case, the compensation contract between shareholders
and the executive not only affects executive’s market decisions, but also provides a rem-
edy to the underinvestment in human capital by workers. These theoretical grounds for
revenue maximisation are in line with the empirical evidence provided by Murphy (1985)
and Baker et al. (1988), concerning the causal relation between firms’ sales and executive’s
remuneration.
Adopting the same framework introduced by Vickers (1985), we investigate here whether
delegation may influence firms’ ability to sustain implicit cartel agreements in repeated
games.
We consider three different settings. First, we tackle the case where collusion takes place
between managers, while shareholders play non-cooperatively. We show that delegation
contracts are always symmetric and that the separation between ownership and control does
1 As shown by Katz (1991), if contracts were unobservable then delegation would have no effect on the equilibrium
of the game, i e it would be the same as in the game without agents See, in particular, Corollary 1 (Katz (1991),
p 315) See also Barcena-Ruiz and Paz Espinoza (1996), p 348
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not affect firms’ incentive to collude, since any pair of symmetric contracts is perceived
by managers as a symmetric shift downwards (upwards) of the cost (demand) function.
Second, we consider the case where collusion takes place between principals in designing
the delegation contracts, under the assumption that managers behave non-cooperatively
throughout the supergame. In this setting, we prove that, if delegation contracts are sym-
metric, delegation reduces the stability of an implicit cartel agreement between owners in
that it makes deviation more appealing as compared to a situation where firms are strict
profit-seeking agents. Third, we investigate a fully-fledged setting where owners decide
whether to delegate or not and, if they do, both groups of individuals either implicitly col-
lude or behave non-cooperatively in setting their respective variables, according to their
intertemporal preferences and the relevant critical levels of discount factors. In this case,
we show that when managers are prone to collusion, i.e. sufficiently patient, then this guar-
antees that owners always obtain a collusive outcome even if they play non-cooperatively.
In other words, the optimal collusive incentive scheme and the optimal non-cooperative
incentive scheme are observationally equivalent. Otherwise, when managers are not suf-
ficiently patient to collude in the market variable, this may not preclude entrepreneurs’
ability to enjoy collusive profits if their intertemporal discount factor is sufficiently high.
Hence, it emerges that owners’ delegation decisions are non-monotone in their individ-
ual discount factor, provided that managers are unable to collude at the market stage.
When owners’ discount factor is extremely low, they can not avoid delegating, due to a
prisoner’s dilemma. Then, there is a range of discount factors for which owners do not
delegate, reaching first the Pareto-efficient payoff of the static game and then the col-
lusive payoff. Finally, for sufficiently high values of the owners’ discount factor, given
owners’ ability to collude while setting the incentive scheme, delegation becomes again the
optimal choice.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic model.
Then, the setting where collusion takes place between agents is dealt with in Section 3,
while Section 4 describes the alternative case in which owners try to collude by optimally
designing their respective delegation contracts. The situation where both groups try to
achieve implicit collusion and the optimal choice between delegation and non delegation
are treated in Sections 5 and 6. Finally, Section 7 provides concluding remarks.
2. The set-up
We adopt the same model as in Vickers (1985). Two firms, which we label i and j , compete
in quantities on a market for a homogeneous product, whose inverse demand function is
p = A− xi − xj . (1)
Under the assumption that production takes place at constant returns to scale, the profit
function of firm i looks as follows:
πi = (p − c)xi (2)
where parameter c < A is the unit production cost.
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If a firm’s owner decides to delegate control over her own assets to a manager, the
objective of the latter is
max
xi
Mi = πi + θixi (3)
where θi measures the relevance of sales, and is to be optimally set by the principal in the
delegation contract, in order to maximise profits. 2
In the remainder, we are going to consider three different situations, where (i) managers
collude while owners play non-cooperatively; (ii) owners collude while managers play
non-cooperatively; and (iii) both groups try to collude. In each setting, the basic stage game
is repeated infinitely many times, over [0,∞). Let αi ∈ [0, 1] define manager i’s individual
discount factor, and δi ∈ [0, 1] define owner i’s individual discount factor. We adopt the
following assumption:
Assumption 1. αi = αj = α and δi = δj = δ.
This amounts to assuming that players are pairwise symmetric as far as their intertemporal
preferences are concerned.
When the game is repeated, the incentive scheme is set at the beginning of each period.
Managers can be substituted at the beginning of each period, for example when they die
or retire, but the new manager will share the same characteristics of the old manager. In
particular he/she will have the same discount factor. Hence, the model can be solved as if
the managers had infinite working lives with the firm.
The measure of cartel stability used is the critical threshold of the discount factor as
yielded by Friedman’s “grim” strategies (Friedman, 1971). We consider the case where
players collude on the maximisation of the joint payoff. 3 Each player colludes as long
as the rival does likewise. After detecting a deviation by either of them, say in period
t ∈ [0,∞), both players revert to the non-cooperative equilibrium strategy forever, from
period t + 1 to ∞. Let σ ∗ define the critical threshold of the discount factor, in the case of
collusion in quantities in a symmetric setting where players are strict profit-seeking firms.
They are able to sustain tacit collusion over time if and only if their discount factor satisfies
the following condition:
σ ≥ σ ∗ = π
D
i − πCi
πDi − πNi
= 9
17
(4)
whereπDi ,π
C
i andπ
N
i define the profits accruing to firm i, respectively, (i) when she deviates
from the collusive agreement; (ii) when both firms collude; and finally (iii) when firms play
2 Managerial remuneration is a two-part wage consisting in a component increasing in θi and a constant which is
set so as to pay the manager his required wage for each level of Mi , i e wi(Mi) = Ai +BiMi We do not assume
a competitive market for managers and so managers do not necessarily receive just their reservation wage Hence,
while maximising their objective function, managers are also maximising their remuneration In Appendix A, it
is shown that the formulation due to Vickers (1985) and that due to Fershtman and Judd (1987) are equivalent
3 We do not consider the case of partial collusion (for an introduction, see Gibbons (1992)) We examine grim
strategies for the sake of comparison with a large part of the existing literature, although grim strategies are not
optimal (symmetric optimal punishments have been modelled by Abreu (1986) and Abreu et al (1986))
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non-cooperatively. Textbook calculations are needed to verify that the critical value of the
discount factor in such a setting is indeed that shown in (4). We adopt it as a benchmark
in the remainder of the paper, where we use δ∗ and α∗ to indicate the owners’ and the
managers’ critical level of the discount factor, respectively.
3. Collusion between managers
We begin with the analysis of the case where collusion can take place only in the market
stage, i.e. between agents. As to the behaviour of owners in the delegation stage, we have
to describe their respective value of θi . We introduce the following assumption:
Assumption 2. If θj > θi , then managers will play non-cooperatively
It is easy to show that, if manager decided to collude and maximise joint surplus, then the
solution would be at a corner where the agent with the higher θ (smallest perceived cost)
produces the optimal quantity given market demand, whereas the other agent accepts not to
produce. But if this is the case, then the manager with the higher θ should accept to share
the surplus with the other manager. In order to do that, some form of side payments should
be used. The sustainability of such an agreement is obviously highly questionable.
Moreover, given the symmetry between owners, we will see that asymmetric incentive
schemes can arise only during a deviation phase from a collusive equilibrium between
owners. Such a phase would last only for one period. It is difficult then to imagine a collusive
agreement based on incentive schemes that are going to be in place only for one period. 4
First of all, we prove the following lemma:
Lemma 1. If owners play non-cooperatively, then incentive schemes, as well as output
levels are always symmetric.
Proof. Given Assumption 2, if incentives are asymmetric, then managers play non-
cooperatively. Vickers (1985) already showed that the non-cooperative equilibrium with
non-cooperative managers involves a symmetric incentive scheme. Hence, asymmetric
incentive schemes can not be part of an equilibrium. 5 
The symmetry between incentive schemes is going to play a relevant role in the remainder
of the analysis. The objective function of the managers at the market stage can be rewritten
as follows:
Mi = (A− xi − xj − γi)xi (5)
where γi = c − θi . This entails that delegation mimics a change in the unit production
cost. On the basis of Lemma 1, at equilibrium θi = θj = θ . Hence, it must also be that
γi = γj = γ , i.e. the perceived change in the unit cost has to be the same for both firms.
4 However, it is possible to show that all the main results of the paper hold when managers are allowed to collude
under an asymmetric incentive scheme and share the surplus equally The proof is avaiable from the authors
5 Vickers (1985) analysis will be quickly presented in Section 4
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Define now MNi , M
C
i , M
D
i , M
Ch
i as, respectively, the payoffs accruing to the manager of
firm i in the Cournot–Nash equilibrium; in the collusive equilibrium; in the case of deviation
by firm i, while the manager of firm j sticks to his cartel output level; and finally, in the
case where the opposite happens (here, superscript Ch stands for cheated). Then, define the
critical threshold of the discount factor stabilising collusion as
α∗ = M
D
i −MCi
MDi −MNi
(6)
It is immediate to verify that in any payoff MJi = βJ(A − γ )2, βJ, which is the relevant
numerical coefficient under the market regime J, is the same with and without delegation.
As a result,
α∗ = σ ∗ = 917 , (7)
i.e. the critical level of the discount factor coincides with that emerging from the game
without delegation, where collusion occurs between entrepreneurs (detailed calculations
are in Appendix B). Consequently, the outcome of this setting can be summarised by the
following proposition.
Proposition 1. When owners play non-cooperatively and collusion takes place between
managers, incentive scheme are symmetric and delegation does not affect cartel stability.
Provided that owners provide their respective managers with any pair of symmetric
contracts, the attempt at colluding on the part of the agents is completely equivalent, in terms
of its stability, to its counterpart when firms are strict profit-seekers. The shift perceived
either in the linear cost function or in the linear market demand function is unable to affect
the incentive structure that characterises the supergame.
4. Collusion between owners
We now consider the case where owners can collude in setting the value of θi , while man-
agers behave à la Cournot, non-cooperatively and simultaneously choosing their respective
production levels. The first-order condition (FOC) facing firm i’s manager in the market
subgame is
∂Mi
∂xi
= A+ θi − c − 2xi − xj = 0. (8)
Solving yields the optimal outputs in terms of the delegation parameters:
xi = A− c + 2θi − θj3 ; xj =
A− c + 2θj − θi
3
. (9)
Substituting and rearranging, we get the following profit function for firm i:
πi = (A− c + 2θi − θj )(A− c − θi − θj )9 . (10)
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The reaction function of firm i’s owner is
θi = A− c − θj4 , (11)
so that non-cooperative profit maximisation w r.t. θi and θj is reached when θNi = θNj =
(A − c)/5, equilibrium profits amounting to πNi = 2(A − c)2/25, obviously lower than
those associated with a Cournot–Nash equilibrium between profit-maximising firms (see
Vickers (1985), p.142).
We are now in a position to investigate the cartel solution, where owners choose θi and
θj in order to maximise joint profits, Π = πi + πj . It is easy to check that joint profits are
maximised by any pair of incentive schemes such that
θi + θj = (c − A)2 (12)
Assumption 3. If owners decide to collude, they adopt a symmetric incentive scheme,
i.e. θCi = θCj = θC.
If managers decide to collude, but they adopt an asymmetric incentive scheme, then the
actual distribution of profits will also be asymmetric and in many cases collusion will have
to be sustained by transfers between firms. In order to avoid this, which would be illegal
and possibly reveal collusion, and to be consistent with Assumption 1, we assume that
asymmetric incentive schemes can be adopted only during a deviation phase, but not in
a collusive equilibrium. Assumption 3 and Lemma 1 guarantee that asymmetric incentive
schemes will never be observed in equilibrium. 6
Setting θi = θj = θ and solving, we obtain θC = (c−A)/4 < 0, while collusive profits
are πCi = πCj = (A − c)2/8. Notice that they coincide with the individual cartel profit
under strict profit-maximising behaviour.
If, say, firm j ’s owner sticks to the cartel level of θj , while the owner of firm i deviates
along his best reply function (11), we get θDi = 5(A−c)/16, entailing the following profits:
πDi =
25
128
(A− c)2; πChj =
5
256
(A− c)2. (13)
The deviation profit is higher than the corresponding magnitude that would be observed if
firms were entrepreneurial. The value of the critical discount factor turns out to be
δ∗ = 25
41
. (14)
Observe that σ ∗ < δ∗. We can summarise the above analysis as follows:
Proposition 2. When collusion takes place between owners, while managers behave non-
cooperatively, collusion is harder to sustain as compared to the case where firms are strict
profit-seekers.
6 If incentive schemes are always symmetric and managers are identical, then managers remunerations are also
always symmetric, i e Ai = Aj and Bi = Bj
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This result can be given the following intuitive interpretation. Individual cartel profit being
independent of the internal organisation of firms, the critical level of the discount factor
is higher in the presence of delegation because (i) the one-shot Nash equilibrium profit
decreases, while (ii) the deviation profit increases as compared to the fully entrepreneurial
setting, and (iii) the increase in the latter outweighs the decrease in the former, yielding a
more unstable cartel by making deviation more attractive than it is when entrepreneurs are
running their respective firms.
5. Two-sided collusion
We can now combine the cases presented so far and analyse the fully fledged setting
where managers have the opportunity to decide whether to collude or not after owners have
set their incentives, either collusively or non-cooperatively. The game takes place over the
time horizon [0,∞) and is organised in three stages, as follows.
Stage 1: at time t = 0, owners decide whether to delegate or not. The strategy set is
Ω = {e,m}, where e stands for entrepreneurial, while m stands for managerial.
If both either do or do not, then
Stage 2: from t = 1 onwards, owners either collude or play non-cooperatively, according
to their intertemporal discount factor and the related stream of discounted profits. In case of
delegation, they set the value of θ appropriately. Otherwise, they set outputs to maximise
joint profit. The strategy set is Ψ = {C,N, θi if m, or xi if e}.
Stage 3: from t = 1 onwards, managers decide whether to collude or to play non-
cooperatively, according to their intertemporal discount factor and the related stream of
discounted payoffs. The strategy set is Φ = {C,N, xi if e}.
If only one owner delegates at t = 0, then
Stage 2: from t = 1 onwards, the owner of the managerial firm sets θ so as to maximise
her individual non-cooperative profit.
Stage 3: from t = 1 onwards, the owner of the entrepreneurial firm and the manager of
the rival firm non-cooperatively set their respective quantities. The decision tree associated
with the game is illustrated below showing discounted profits per firm.
Observe that the tree exclusively features symmetric decisions and discounted pay-
offs. Below, we deal with the three relevant asymmetric situations that can arise, namely,
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(i) one-sided delegation; (ii) a deviation takes place between owners, while managers are
trying to collude; and (iii) a deviation takes place between owners, while managers are
playing non-cooperatively.
5.1. The delegation dilemma revisited
Here, we briefly examine the possibility for owners to avoid delegation in an infinitely
repeated game. This opens a perspective where owners may indeed be able to avoid the
separation between ownership and control, but still they may prefer to delegate because
managers are more patient than owners. Hence, delegation can allow owners to gain collusive
profits they could not obtain by themselves.
The one-shot setting originally presented by Vickers (1985) belongs to the prisoner’s
dilemma family, the relevant per period profits beingπNi (m;m) = [2(A−c)2]/25 when both
firms are managerial,πNi (e; e) = (A−c)2/9 when both are entrepreneurial, andπNi (e;m) =
(A−c)2/16; πNj (m; e) = (A−c)2/8 when firm i is entrepreneurial while firm j is manage-
rial. The Nash equilibrium of the game involves delegation by both owners, but this is not
Pareto efficient, because both owners would be better off if they did not delegate. However,
both owners are led to delegate since it represents a dominant strategy, i.e. the willingness of
each owner to be the only one to delegate drives the result. If Vickers’ game is repeated an
infinite number of times, and at the market stage the agents always play à la Cournot–Nash,
then it is easy to show that collusion on the “no delegation” decision is sustainable if
δ ≥ 25
81
. (15)
Moreover, observe that the profit accruing to the managerial firm, when the rival is a
strict profit-seeker, exactly corresponds to the collusive payoff yielded by symmetric car-
tel behaviour. Hence, if at time t = 0 firm i’s owner chooses not to delegate, it appears
reasonable to assume that no collusion is going to take place from t = 1 onwards, for two
related reasons. The first is that the strategic variables to the avail of players differ: once
firm i has decided to remain entrepreneurial, its owner must compete on the market with
the manager of the rival firm, and does not directly interact with the other owner. Second,
as a consequence, the owner of the entrepreneurial firm cannot expect the owner of the
managerial firm to set θ so as to maximise joint profit, and vice versa.
5.2. Deviation under two-sided collusion
Consider now the case where both owners decide to delegate. They have to decide whether
to collude while choosing θ , or not. Given Lemma 1 and Assumption 3, in both the col-
lusive and the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium they will choose θi = θj = θ . Then we
already know that, if this is the case, managers will play collusively if α ≥ 9/17, and
non-cooperatively if α < 9/17. We consider these two cases separately.
5.2.1. Patient managers (α ≥ 9/17)
If managers are patient, then we know from Section 3 that they will collude if faced with
θi = θj = θ , and, in order to avoid transfers, they will set
9
xCi = xCj = xC =
A− c + θ
4
(16)
Consequently, the owners’ payoffs become
πi = πj = πCC = (A− c)
2 − θ2
8
, (17)
which leads to an optimal choice of
θi = θj = θC = θN = 0 (18)
In other words, if managers are patient, owners will always choose θ = 0 as the optimal
incentive scheme no matter how they decide to play. Intuitively, if managers are going to
collude, then owners anticipate that and by forcing the managers to strictly maximise prof-
its, they get the maximum feasible payoff, i.e. collusive profit, and this holds even if they
decide to play non-cooperatively. But if this is the case, there is no incentive to collude in
the first place.
Proposition 3. If managers are patient (α ≥ 9/17) , owners will always play non-
cooperatively, enjoying however the collusive outcome.
5.2.2. Impatient managers (α < 9/17)
Given Assumption 2, after a deviation managers will keep on playing non-cooperatively.
Consequently, managers will always play non-cooperatively. Hence, the results found in
Section 4 apply and owners will collude on θC = (c − A)/4 as long as δ ≥ 25/41.
6. Solving the supergame
We are now in a position to characterise the subgame perfect equilibria of the supergame
under two-sided collusion. We first deal with the cases where managers are impatient
(α < 9/17).
6.1. Impatient managers (α < 9/17)
Given Assumption 2, here, managers will always play à la Cournot–Nash, no matter what
is the incentive they face. Four relevant ranges can be identified for the owners’ factor δ.
1. δ ∈ (0, 25/81). In this range, no group can collude, and owners are unable to avoid
delegation. Hence, the subgame perfect equilibrium of the supergame is characterised
as follows. Owners: (m,N); managers: N . Per period individual profit is πNi (m;m) =
[2(A− c)2]/25.
2. δ ∈ [25/81, 9/17). In this range, no group can collude, but owners are able to avoid
delegation. Thus, the subgame perfect equilibrium of the supergame is characterised
as follows. Owners: (e,N); managers: N . Per period individual profit is πNi (e; e) =
(A− c)2/9.
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3. δ ∈ [9/17, 25/41). In this range, owners are in a position to collude in quantities if they
do not delegate, while they are unable to collude in setting the incentive schemes. Hence,
the subgame perfect equilibrium of the supergame is characterised as follows. Owners:
(e, C), managers: N . Per period individual profit is πCi (e; e) = (A− c)2/8.
4. δ ∈ [25/41, 1). In this range, owners are in a position to collude in any variable, as well
as to avoid delegation. Consequently, the subgame perfect equilibrium of the supergame
is characterised as follows. Owners: (m,C); managers: N . Per period individual profit
is πCi (m;m) = (A− c)2/8.
It is useful to represent this setting as a game in normal form. This is done in
Matrix 1. 7
The north-west cell of Matrix 1 contains cartel profits in that owners will collude if
the keep control of their respective firms, in this range of δ. It is immediate to check that
{(m,C), (m,C)} is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the game and is Pareto-optimal.
{(e, C), (e, C)} is also a Nash equilibrium, but it involves weakly dominated strategies and
hence cannot be subgame perfect. Here, owners delegate control to managers notwithstand-
ing δ is large, for purely strategic reasons.
The above discussion can be summarised by the following proposition:
Proposition 4. When managers are impatient, owners’ delegation decision is non-monotone
in their discount factor δ. They first delegate for low δ ’s, then they do not delegate for in-
termediate δ ’s and finally they delegate again for high δ ’s. When δ ≥ 9/17(δ < 9/17),
owners always collude (play non-cooperatively) in the relevant variable.
6.2. Patient managers (α ≥ 9/17)
As we have seen in Section 5, if both owners delegate and managers are patient, the
only sustainable equilibrium at the incentive stage entails non collusive behaviour with
θi = θj = 0, no matter what the owners’ discount factor is. This also allows to es-
tablish that, regardless of the value of δ, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the
supergame entails owners choosing (m,N) and managers choosing C. In order to gain
a complete picture, it suffices to consider the range δ ∈ (25/81, 9/17), where owners
are not able to collude at the market stage. The payoff matrix of the repeated game is as
follows.
7 The letters in the bottom right corner of each cell indicate wheter owners collude or play Nash in the relevant
variable As already mentioned, in case of one-sided delegation, Nash behaviour is the only option
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The equilibrium {(m,N), (m,N)} is the only Nash equilibrium of the game (as well as
the only subgame perfect equilibrium of the supergame, obviously) and is also the Pareto
optimum. Hence, if owners are unable to implicitly collude at the market stage, but man-
agers are patient, then owners can use delegation as a tool to reach the collusive outcome
through managers. Moreover, managers are required to simply maximise profits (θ = 0),
i.e. managers matter only because they are different people in that they have a different
discount factor allowing them to reach the collusive outcome, but not because they have a
different objective function.
We can conclude that plugging Vickers’ original setting in a two-sided repeated collusion
game changes the conclusions quite dramatically, by making delegation an optimal choice
not only when other players do not delegate, but also when everybody else delegates, if
myopic owners can benefit from the behaviour of forward-looking managers.
The above findings can be summarised by the following proposition:
Proposition 5. When managers are patient, the owners’ decisions are (m,N) indepen-
dently of the level of their discount factor δ.
7. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have analysed how, in a simple duopoly setting, the ability to collude
for the two firms depends on the presence of delegation of output decisions.
When agents can collude, but owners cannot, then the critical discount factor is the same
as in a normal duopoly without delegation. Hence, in this case delegation does not affect
firms’ ability to collude. When owners can collude, but agents cannot, then delegation makes
collusion more difficult in that deviation along the individual best reply at the incentive stage
becomes more attractive than deviation at the output would be if owners were running their
respective firms themselves.
When both managers and owners can collude, we have two possible cases. If managers
are patient, i.e. they would collude in a standard Cournot game, at the incentive stage the
optimal non-cooperative incentive scheme coincides with the collusive incentive scheme.
Hence, we conclude that managers will always behave non-cooperatively, enjoying however
the collusive outcome.
If managers are unable to sustain collusion at the market stage, i.e. they would not collude
in a standard Cournot game, the two-sided collusion game reveals a non-monotonicity in
the delegation decision by owners, as their individual discount factor increases, i.e. as they
become more patient.
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The results derived for the two-sided collusion case allowed us to reconsider the delegation
dilemma of Vickers (1985). In the static game, delegation is the equilibrium, but it would
be Pareto efficient for the two owners not to delegate. If, however, the possibility to collude
at both the market stage and/or at the incentive stage is considered the conclusions change
substantially. If managers are impatient, but owners are sufficiently patient and can collude,
then delegation is the optimal strategy for owners in the repeated game. This is opposite to
Vickers (1985), where patient owners would find it feasible not to delegate in the repeated
game. If managers are patient, but owners are impatient, then again delegation is the optimal
strategy for owners, because by delegating they can take advantage of managers’ ability to
sustain cartel behaviour, so that owners enjoy the collusive outcome anyway.
Appendix A
In the main text, we adopt the function Mi = πi+θixi as the manager’s maximand. This
rewrites as follows:
Mi = pxi − (c − θi)xi . (A.1)
Consider now the managerial objective function introduced by Fershtman and Judd
(1987), which is defined as a linear combination of firm’s profits and revenues, Ωi =
αiπi + (1 − αi)pxi , which rewrites as:
Ωi = pxi − αicxi . (A.2)
The owner chooses αi to maximise profits. It is a matter of straightforward calculations to
show thatMi andΩi coincide if θi = (1−αi)c. As an example, we prove that this is indeed
the case in the one-shot delegation game. As usual, we solve the game by backward induc-
tion. At the market stage, managers maximise non-cooperatively their respective objective
functions Ωi and Ωj in a Cournot fashion. This yields the following best reply function for
manager i:
xi = A− xj − αic2 . (A.3)
Notice that the output level increases as αi decreases, i.e. as the weight attached to revenues
in the managerial maximand increases. The optimal output level is xi(αi, αj ) = (A+αjc−
2αic)/3, entailing profits πi(αi, αj ) = [A+ c(αi + αj − 3)][A+ c(αj − 2αi)]/9 accruing
to the owner of firm i, whose best reply at the first stage of the game is
αi = 6c − A− cαj4c . (A.4)
If both owners delegate, then αNi = αNj = (6c − A)/(5c). Therefore, output levels are
xNi = xNj = [2(A − c)]/5 and profits are πNi (m;m) = πNj (m;m) = [2(A − c)2]/25,
which coincide with the results obtained by Vickers (1985), see also Section 5.1 of this
paper. In Vickers (1985), the optimal extent of delegation is θNi = θNj = (A− c)/5, and it
is immediately verified that θNi = (1− αNi )c. Analogous considerations hold in the case of
one-sided delegation.
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Appendix B
Consider first the case where managers maximise the joint objective function MC =
Mi +Mj . On the basis of Lemma 1, we impose θi = θj = θ . The FOC for joint surplus
maximisation is
∂MC
∂(xi + xj ) = A+ θ − c − 2(xi + xj ) = 0 (B.1)
from which
xi + xj = A− c + θ2 . (B.2)
To keep the symmetry of the game we assume that xCi = xCj = xC = (A− c+ θ)/4. Then,
solving and simplifying yields
MCi =
(A− c + θ)2
8
(B.3)
as the individual collusive payoff. Easy although tedious calculations are required to check
that
MNi =
(A− c + θ)2
9
; MDi =
9(A− c + θ)2
64
; MChi =
3(A− c + θ)2
32
,(B.4)
so that MDi > M
N
i > M
Ch
i , and the punishment is credible. The critical discount factor α
(see Eq. (7)) turns out to be unaffected by the separation between ownership and control.
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